Visa Bulletin - Encrypting PIN Pads Must Be Industry-Approved
Visa reminds clients that they are required to purchase and deploy only PCI-approved EPPs, which undergo rigorous testing to ensure the highest level of security for cardholder PINs.
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Read the bulletin
Visa Updates the Compromised PIN Entry Device Listing and Reminds Members of Upcoming Mandatory Sunset Dates
Compromised point of sale (POS) PIN entry devices (PEDs) have been used in tampering and skimming attacks to capture PIN and magnetic stripe card data. Visa members must take action to mitigate the risks introduced by these compromised POS PEDs. This bulletin provides a list of the known compromised POS PED makes and models and skimming prevention best practices.
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Migrating From a Single DES Key to a Triple DES Key in a Triple DES-Capable Terminal
MasterCard is providing guidance about how merchants and acquirers should migrate from a Single Data Encryption Standard (Single DES) key to a Triple DES key in a Triple DES capable point-of-interaction (POI) terminal.
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Retirement of Pre-PCI Attended POS PIN Entry Devices
VISA provides retirement planning tools for your pre-PCI attended POS PIN entry devices, including:
A table listing the three device categories and their associated sunset dates
PED retirement planning best practices
Links to related documents
► View this resource from VISA
Note: In this bulletin, Visa announced a mandatory sunset date of 31 December 2014 for all pre-PCI attended POS PEDs. However, a newer bulletin, Visa Updates Compromised PIN Entry Device Listing and Reminds Members of Upcoming Mandatory Sunset Dates, recommends that certain devices should be replaced as soon as possible to prevent tampering.
PIN Entry Device Program Information Update
Several initiatives to improve PIN security and transaction protection are approaching a key deadline in July 2010. These include adoption of Triple -DES (TDES) encryption requirements and point-of-sale PIN entry device (POS PED) hardware certification. This security standards compliance update shows the progression of the requirements, discusses Triple DES and summarizes the POS PED categories and applicable dates.
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POS PIN Entry Device Vulnerabilities
Compromised point-of-sale (POS) PIN-entry devices (PEDs) equipped with tapping mechanisms designed to capture PIN and card data have recently been found in the U.S. marketplace. Visa clients must take action to mitigate the risks introduced by these compromised POS PEDs.
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Differences Between PCI-PED 2.0 and 2.1
There are no functional differences or new requirements between PCI-PED 2.0 and 2.1, as shown in the table below.
► View the current PCI 2.x security requirements (source of the table below).
Date |
Version |
Description |
9/2006 |
2.x |
Draft published for comment |
11/2006 |
2.x |
Formatting changes |
4/2007 |
2.x |
A1, A7, A11, B1, B4, B11, B13, D1, D4 |
7/2007 |
2.0 |
PCI Security Standards Council adoption of PED requirements |
1/2009 |
2.1 |
Clarifications and errata |
Visa TDES Seminar Recap
In early September 2009, Visa held a webinar about TDES compliance and Visa best practices.
► Here is a link to that slide presentation Please pay particular note to pages 11-17.
PCI DSS Wireless Guidelines
This document provides the first highly specific, actionable wireless operational guide for complying with PCI DSS, including:
- Generally applicable wireless requirements: These are requirements that all organizations should have in place to protect their networks from attacks via rogue or unknown wireless access points (APs) and clients.
- Requirements applicable for in-scope wireless networks: These are requirements that all organizations that transmit payment card information over wireless technology should have in place to protect those systems.
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New PCI Security Information: PCI DSS v1.2 Released
Abstract: The Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council (PCI SSC) has released the new version 1.2 of the Data Security Standard (DSS) . Find out how this change will impact PCI validation for your company.
► Download this document.
PIN Pad Security Best Practices
Abstract: Due to repeated targeting of pre-PED PIN Pads and Payment Terminals, VeriFone has developed PIN Pad Security Best Practices. These best practices first enable a retailer to determine if any existing terminals have been tampered with, and second make tampering much more difficult by implementing a comprehensive set of security controls to prevent tampering and more quickly become aware if tampering has occurred.
► View the PIN Pad Security Best Practices
Additional information can be found on VeriFone's Retail Payment Security web site at www.secureretailpayments.com.
PCI Security Standards Council Releases Version 3.0 of PTS Security Requirements
On May 12, 2010, the PCI Security Standards Council (PCI SSC) announced the publishing of version 3.0 of the PIN Transaction Security (PTS) Point of Interaction (POI) security requirements. Version 3.0 streamlines and simplifies testing and implementation by providing a single set of modular evaluation requirements for all Personal Identification Number (PIN) acceptance Point of Interaction terminals.
► Go to the Council's website for the updated standard and detailed listing of approved devices.
► Download PCI SSC press release (PDF)
Industry News Flash from VeriFone: Pin Pad Tampering
Abstract: VeriFone assures that none of its VISA PED or PCI PED (Payment Card Industry PIN Entry Device) approved terminals were part of the recent tampering stories and that solutions such as the VeriFone MX800 Series meet all current PCI PED Security Requirements, including tamper prevention and detection. VeriFone explains the process of tampering, describes current industry security requirements to prevent tampering, describes payment terminal security, and outlines the steps needed to improve PIN pad security.
► Get this document in PDF format or ► visit the VeriFone website.
VISA also provides security information on their website.